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ONLINE COURT RECORDS: BALANCING JUDICIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY AND PRIVACY IN AN AGE OF
ELECTRONIC INFORMATION
Peter A. Winn*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Francis Bacon said that knowledge is power.' He could just as easily
have identified power with the control of information. As Bacon-the
lawyer, judge, and Lord Chancellor-well knew, courts were and still
are the pre-eminent information systems-institutions that process
information and translate it into the exercise of power; in the case of
courts, by rendering judgments. Later Enlightenment thinkers such as
Cesare Beccaria well understood the connection between judicial
information and power, and argued forcefully that all trials should be
public.2 Publicity was viewed as a check against the misuse of judicial
power, tending to limit unfair (or at least unpopular) prosecutions by the
rulers of a society, as well as increasing public respect for the legal
system. Of course, while the legal system has inherited from the
Enlightenment a presumption of openness, that presumption has always
been limited when unfair publicity, itself, threatens to become an
* Senior Fellow, University of Washington School of Law; Lecturer, Graduate Studies
Department, University of Melbourne School of Law; Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Department of
Justice. The views expressed in this Article are the author's personal views and should not be
interpreted as reflecting the position of the U.S. Department of Justice. The author wishes to express
his gratitude to the following persons for their comments: Judge Donald Horowitz, Judge Dennis
Michael Lynn, Dan Solove, Robert Ellis Smith, Gregory Silverman, and Katie Simon.
1. See JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS Ill (Christopher Morley & Louella D. Everett
eds., 11th ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1940) (1882) (attributing quote "Nam et ipsa scientia potestas
est" (knowledge is power) to Francis Bacon in his work Meditationes Sacrae,De Haeresibus). The
use of the term potestas by Bacon was no accident. Potestas is used to denote legal power or
control, and Bacon, in his professional life, served in many different judicial capacities, including
that of Lord Chancellor.
2. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 22-27, 99 (Henry Paolucci trans., BobbsMerrill Co. 1963) (1764).
3. "Let the verdicts and proofs of guilt be made public, so that opinion, which is, perhaps, the sole
cement of society, may serve to restrain power and passions; so that the people may say, we are not
slaves, and we are protected-a sentiment which inspires courage and which is the equivalent of a
tribute to a sovereign who knows his own true interests." Id. at 22.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 79:307, 2004

instrument of oppression. Experience teaches us that at times, open
judicial proceedings can ensure, rather than prevent, the abuse of judicial
power, can create unacceptable risks of a miscarriage of justice, and can
cause unnecessary harm to the safety and privacy of individuals.
This Article examines the traditional balance courts have reached
between the disclosure of information generated by the judicial process
and the need at times to limit the disclosure of that information. The
Article then examines how this traditional balance is upset when judicial
information is placed online. The Article argues that as courts adapt to a
world of electronic information, new rules and practices must be
established to maintain the policies underlying the traditional balance.
While there must continue to be a presumption of openness, courts must
limit the disclosure of judicial information when it threatens the effective
administration of justice and when necessary in order to protect the
safety and privacy of individuals participating in the judicial process.
A.

Access to Information in CriminalProceedings

The presumption of openness of judicial proceedings is embodied in
the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees the
accused in every criminal case the right to a public trial.4 In the words of
Justice Hugo Black, the Sixth Amendment is "a safeguard against any
attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution. The
knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous
review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible
5
abuse of judicial power.",
At the same time, the presumption of openness is limited when it
interferes with the fair and impartial administration of justice, or
threatens the safety or the reasonable expectation of privacy of the
participants in the judicial process. Thus, there is no general public right
of access to federal grand jury proceedings,6 which under Federal Rule

4. U.S. CONST. amend. Vi ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have

compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defense.").
5. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948).
6. See United States v. John Doe, Inc. I, 481 U.S. 102, 109 n.5 (1989); United States v. Sells
Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424 (1982); Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops N.W., 441 U.S. 211, 218
(1979); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 (1958).
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of Criminal Procedure 6(e) are conducted in secrecy.7 This rule protects
the reputations of individuals if they are innocent, and limits their
opportunities for obstruction of justice if they are guilty. 8 Applications
for search warrants and for electronic surveillance nearly always take
place in secret. 9 Finally, judges have the discretion to close the
courtroom to public spectators when necessary to achieve a fair trialfor instance, when faced with witness intimidation'l or other disruption
to the judicial proceedings." The Sixth Amendment confers no special
benefits on the press,1 2 and the right to a public judicial proceeding may
be waived by a defendant--one who, for instance, may wish to limit the
risk that he may be harmed if his counterparts learn of an agreement to
cooperate with the government's investigation. Many criminal court
records are prepared and maintained entirely in secret. For example,
there is no right of public access to pre-sentence reports that are prepared
by the federal probation office and contain extremely sensitive
information about criminal defendants' health, mental condition, family
history, and finances.' 3
In addition to the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant to a
public trial, the U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized a limited right
of access to criminal judicial proceedings under the First Amendment of
the Constitution. 14 In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,'5 the Court
held that "[i]n guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press,
the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to
'' 6
attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees.
7. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).

8. See, e.g., Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. at 424 ("Grand jury secrecy, then, is 'as important for the
protection of the innocent as for the pursuit of the guilty."' (quoting United States v. Johnson, 319
U.S. 503, 513 (1943))).
9. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(b) (2000) (providing for the sealing of applications for electronic
surveillance); The Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1216-18 (9th Cir. 1989)
(refusing to disclose affidavits submitted in support of a search warrant application because of
reputational and privacy concerns of yet unindicted persons named in the affidavit).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1357-59 (9th Cir. 1989); Bruno v.
Herold, 408 F.2d 125, 127-28 (2d Cir. 1969); State v. Rusin, 568 A.2d 403, 405-06 (Vt. 1989).
11.See United States v. Akers, 542 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 1976).
12. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610 (1978) (citing Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532, 583 (1965)).
13. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 12 (1988); United States v. Corbitt,
879 F.2d 224, 237 (7th Cir. 1989).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
16. Id. at 575; see also Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1986).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 79:307, 2004

Nevertheless, the right of access to the courts is not absolute. Courts
continue to have the duty to balance the presumption in favor of public
access against other interests that may justify restricting access. These
include the possibility of prejudicial pretrial publicity; the danger of
impairing law enforcement or judicial efficiency; and the protection of
the legitimate privacy interests7 of litigants and other persons, such as
witnesses, victims, and jurors. 1
B.

Access to Information in Civil Proceedings

In the context of civil proceedings, it has been held that the Sixth8
Amendment does not support a general constitutional right of access.'
Nevertheless, for many of the same underlying reasons supporting public
access to criminal proceedings, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a
common law right "to inspect and copy public records and documents,
including judicial records and documents." 19 In Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc.,20 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, articulated
the limits on this common law right of access: "It is uncontested,
however, that the right to inspect and copy judicial records is not
absolute. Every court has supervisory power over its own records and
files, and access has been denied21 where court files might have become a
vehicle for improper purposes.,
In Nixon, the Court considered whether the press could obtain copies
of tape recordings of conversations between former President Nixon and
various members of his staff that had been introduced into evidence in
the trials of these staff members. 22 Although these tape recordings had
been played in public during the trial, until then the press had only been
able to obtain transcripts of the tapes.23 The Court held that after the
conclusion of the judicial proceedings, Nixon's interest in privacy
outweighed the common law right of the press to have copies of the

17. See Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607-10 (1982); Ctr. for Nat'l
Sec. Studies v. United States Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 920, 937 (D.C. Cir. 2003); United
States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 811 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044,
1047-50 (2d Cir. 1995).
18. See Satterfield v. Edenton-Chowan Bd. of Educ., 530 F.2d 567, 573 (4th Cir. 1975).
19. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
20. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).

21. Id. at 598.
22. Id. at 589.
23. Id.
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tapes, particularly when the only purpose that could be cited for the
release of the copies was their potential for commercial exploitation.24
As stated by the Court in Nixon, the underlying purpose of the
common law right of access is the "citizen's desire to keep a watchful
eye on the workings of public agencies and in a newspaper publisher's
intention to publish information concerning the operation of
government., 25 In another leading case, In re Continental Illinois
Securities Litigation,26 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
stated that the purpose of the common law right of access is to allow the
citizenry to "monitor the functioning of our courts, thereby insuring [sic]
quality, honesty, and respect for our legal system. 27 This rationale, of
course, comes directly from Enlightenment thinkers such as Beccaria.28
C.

BalancingAccess andPrivacy

Understanding the rationale for public access to judicial proceedings,
however, also reveals the limitations of that rationale. These limitations
become evident when courts must balance the presumption of the
openness of judicial proceedings against the need to keep certain types
of information confidential-in particular, sensitive personal
information. Courts tend to favor public access when the underlying
purpose of public access is to ensure the integrity of the judicial
process. 29 On the other hand, courts tend to protect personal information
when the purpose of access is not related to facilitating public scrutiny of
the judicial process, but to exploiting information in judicial records for
commercial or other purposes unrelated to public oversight of the
judicial system. 30 The balance worked out by the courts bears a close
analogy to the concept of fair information practices as applied in the
context of the federal Privacy Act 31 and the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA).32 Under this body of law, an agency collecting personal
24. Id. at 602.
25. Id. at 598 (citations omitted).
26. 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984).
27. Id. at 1308.
28. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
29. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-78 (1980); In re Cont'l I11.
Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1313-16 (7th Cir. 1984).
30. See, e.g., Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607-10 (1982); In re The
Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470, 474-78 (6th Cir. 1983).
31. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000).
32. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
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information for one purpose is not ordinarily permitted to use that
information for a different unrelated purpose.3 3 Public access to sensitive
personal information about individuals is generally prohibited unless it
serves the purpose of ensuring accountability in government.34 In a very
similar manner, the cases involving access to court records evidence a
careful effort to balance the presumption of public access and the
privacy rights of individuals.35 In framing this balance, courts are
sensitive to protect not only the personal privacy of litigants, but also the
harm that can come to others, such as witnesses, victims, jurors, and
other third parties, who may have no control over the information so
disclosed.
The sensitivity shown by court decisions in balancing access and
privacy in the context of judicial records reflects the large body of
judicial experience addressing questions of privacy in other contexts.
Courts are accustomed to balancing the social benefits from the
disclosure of personal information against the risk of harm that such
disclosure may cause the individuals who are so identified. For example,
in Nixon v. Administratorof General Services,36 the U.S. Supreme Court
determined that President Nixon had a constitutional privacy interest in
records of his private communications with his family, but not in records
of his official duties.37
Courts have also shown particular sensitivity in protecting personal
health information from disclosure. In Whalen v. Roe,38 the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized that because of its great sensitivity, personal
health information is protected under a constitutional right to
information privacy. 39 However, in Whalen, the Court permitted the
collection of this personal health information for purposes of public
health and safety when there were strong and effective assurances that
the information so collected would be kept confidential.4 ° In these cases,

33. See id. §§ 552-552a.
34. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
772-73 (1989); see also United States Dep't of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 600-03
(1982).
35. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 775; Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. at

600-01.
36. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 449, 457-59.
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
Id. at 598-600.
Id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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courts have excelled in demonstrating a great capacity for careful and
nuanced balance.a'
In the leading case of Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. United States,42
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit set out five factors that
must be considered in determining the appropriate constitutional balance
between personal privacy and a governmental interest in disclosure of
health records: (1) the type of health record requested and the type of
health information it contains, (2) the potential for harm in any
subsequent non-consensual disclosure of the information, (3) the injury
from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated,
(4) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, and
(5) the degree of need for access.4 3 Relying on the Westinghouse test,
some courts have found a constitutional tort under 42 U.S.C. § 198344
for the improper disclosure of health information by state government
officials.45 On the other hand, in Doe v. Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority,46 the same appellate court found that the
disclosure of medical records to the administrator of a health benefit
plan was not actionable.4 7
The pragmatic reasons supporting the need for public access (for
example, the need to assure credibility and accountability of the judicial
system) are typically balanced against the pragmatic reasons supporting
the need to restrict public access (for example, protecting the rights of
litigants to a fair trial, protecting the rights of individuals to privacy, and
protecting individuals from harm caused by misuse of their personal
information). While courts are vigilant in protecting the public right of
access when it is consistent with ensuring the credibility of the judicial

41. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 456; Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605-06.
42. 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
43. Id. at 578.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (providing a civil cause of action against states for the "deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws").
45. Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 378, 382 (D.N.J. 1990) (finding a violation
of the plaintiffs constitutional right to privacy when a police officer who had arrested the plaintiff
disclosed to the plaintiffs neighbor the fact that the plaintiff had HIV); Woods v. White, 689 F.
Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (holding that the constitutional right of privacy extended to the
fact that a prison inmate had tested positive for HIV where allegedly disclosed by prison medical
personnel to non-medical staff and other inmates), aff'd without opinion, 899 F.2d 17 (7th Cir.
1990).
46. 72 F.3d 1133 (3d Cir. 1995).
47. Id. at 1143.
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system,48 they are also quick to protect individuals from the exploitation
of their personal information when it bears little relationship to ensuring
the integrity of the judicial process. 49 This common law and
constitutional balance, carefully worked out on a case-by-case basis over
the course of many years, represents the finest form of judicial
lawmaking. While a system that relies on the discretion of judges
sometimes runs the risk of occasional inconsistent decisions, 50 by and
large, courts have shown that they are capable of exercising their
discretion to carefully weigh competing interests, and their decisions
show great nuance, factual subtlety, and legal imagination.
II.

ELECTRONIC JUDICIAL RECORDS: HOW TO MAINTAIN
BALANCE

A.

The Move from PaperRecords to ElectronicRecords

When courts move from the world of paper judicial records to the
world of electronic judicial records, they must confront the same issues
underlying the information revolution throughout our society. The
revolution in the use of electronic information has seen the capacities of
hardware, software, and communications networks continually increase
and their costs continually decrease. This has permitted information to
be used in ways that were previously impractical. In the law, the
conversion from paper to electronic judicial records has provided courts
and attorneys the opportunity to obtain substantial benefits in the
operation of the legal system. 5' The conversion also offers the public the
opportunity to better understand and appreciate the judicial process.
However, as our legal system undergoes the transformation to a
system of electronic judicial records-with all its substantial benefits-it
48. See supranotes 25-29 and accompanying text.
49. See supranotes 21-24, 30 and accompanying text.
50. Professor Solove, for instance, takes the position that the current system does not provide
enough protection for individual privacy. See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public
Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1154-59 (2002).
51. The federal electronic case filing system offers the following benefits: 24-hour access to case
files over the Internet, ability to file pleadings electronically with the court, automatic e-mail notice
of case activity, ability to download and print up-to-date documents directly from the court system,
no waiting in line, expanded search and reporting capacities, the elimination of the cost of expensive
courier services, and an overall reduction in the physical storage space needs of the courts. See
Federal Public Access to Court Electronic Records ("PACER") system website, at
http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/cmecf (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
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is critical to ask how the advantages of public access are to be balanced
against the other competing policies that have served to limit access in
the past, such as maintaining the integrity of the judicial system and
protecting individuals from invasion of their privacy and misuse of their
personal information. It is temptingly easy to assume that if one applies
the same set of rules to electronic judicial records that was applied in the
past to paper records, it will result in the same balance between the
various competing policies. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The
assumption of parity represents a serious misunderstanding of the
differences between paper records and electronic records. When the
same rules that have been worked out for the world of paper records are
applied to electronic records, the result does not preserve the balance
worked out between the competing policies in the world of paper
records, but dramatically alters that balance. It shifts the balance away
from individual privacy, producing little if any benefit on the side of
judicial accountability.
In this context, to assert that electronic judicial records should be
placed under the same rules as paper records is nothing more than to
advocate for the free flow of information at the expense of the many
other competing values. This position appears to be driven more by an
abstract philosophy about the importance of the free flow of information
than a study of the actual historical experience of courts. That experience
forces us to recognize that the flow of information can have very serious
and concrete consequences-not all of them beneficial to the effective
administration of justice or the protection of the dignity and security of
individuals. For instance, the unrestricted shift to electronic court
records permits the type of commercial exploitation of judicial records
that courts have traditionally eschewed. Such commercial exploitation of
judicial records harms the privacy of litigants with virtually no
corresponding benefit to the administration or the accountability of the
justice system. Furthermore, if the shift from paper to electronic court
records takes place without appropriate safeguards, we will celebrate the
abstract value of the free flow of judicial information at the cost of the
privacy and security of litigants and other participants in the judicial
system. They will lose not only their interest in privacy-their identities
will be subject to potential misuse by thieves, and their children may be
exposed to sexual predators. Instead of increasing social respect for the
judicial system, unrestricted access to court records will undermine the
respect and confidence the courts in this country have traditionally
enjoyed.
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The "PracticalObscurity" of PaperRecords also Protects Privacy

In the past, paper-based records, while technically public, continued
to retain a high degree of "practical obscurity. ' 2 This was true because
the retrieval of paper records involved costs that do not attend the
retrieval of electronic records. In the world of paper judicial records,
personal information could be open to the "public" in the sense that it
could be accessed by any member of the general public, but the costs of
retrieval limited access as a practical matter. Only those with a relatively
strong interest in the information would take time out of their day, wait
in line at the clerk's office, fill out the necessary forms, and pay the
necessary copy charges. Once judicial records go online, however,
computerized compilers can search, aggregate, and combine the
information with information from many other public filings to create a
profile of a specific individual in a matter of minutes, at minimal cost.
Information in many different locations can be combined and aggregated
in ways that previously were impossible, permitting entirely new uses of
the information that could never have been intended before. These
search, aggregation, and bulk dissemination capabilities can handle
major magnitudes of information, take little time, and have minimal
cost. While there may be social benefits from this increased access to
personal information, electronic access will also mean that court
records
53
can be commercialized in ways they have never been before.
Paper records also exist in time and space differently from electronic
records. Paper records-like human beings-are organic. As such, they
experience a natural progression of decay and change. Over time, paperbased information accumulates and grows old and must be cleared away
to make room for the new. The "practical obscurity" of old records
generates an expectation of privacy that has been recognized as
legitimate by common law courts. 54 The concept of practical obscurity
developed by federal courts in the context of FOIA cases also recognizes
that the passage of time may actually increase the privacy interest at
stake when disclosure would revive information that was once public
52. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 762, 780 (1989).
53. See Solove, supranote 50, at 1149-52.
54. See, e.g., Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 483 P.2d 34, 36, 44 (Cal. 1971) (holding that

a truthful publication of an eleven-year old criminal conviction constitutes a valid cause of action
for invasion of privacy); Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 91, 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931) (holding that a
movie truthfully depicting plaintiff's previous life as a prostitute many years earlier constitutes a
valid cause of action for invasion of right to pursue happiness).
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knowledge but has long since faded from memory." On the other hand,
electronic records are inorganic; they do not grow old, get moved to
warehouses, or eventually get destroyed. They continue to exist,
potentially forever. In an age of electronic information, a serious
question arises as to whether a rehabilitated criminal will be allowed to
put his past behind him, 56 whether a former prostitute who was acquitted
of a murder charge will ever be allowed to forget it, 57 or whether a
victim of a sexual assault will be allowed to heal her wounds and not be
victimized 5 once
again by reminder and new public disclosure many
8
years later.
C.

The Dark Side of Online Access

In this context, it may be helpful to examine other examples of online
information. Putting consumer credit information online has permitted
credit-reporting agencies to aggregate huge amounts of personal
financial information. While this has created unprecedented access to
consumer credit in the United States, it also has spawned a new type of
crime-identity theft. Identity theft is now reaching epidemic
proportions and has left millions of innocent victims little, if any, means
of redress.5 9 In health care, the electronic revolution has created new
opportunities for advances in medicine, but it also has begun to

55. See, e.g., Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 767 ("[O]ur cases have also
recognized the privacy interest inherent in the non-disclosure of certain information even when the
information may have been at one time public."); Rose v. Dep't of the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 267
(2d Cir. 1974) ("[A] person's privacy may be as effectively infringed by reviving dormant
memories as by imparting new information."), affd, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
56. See Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 36.
57. See Melvin, 297 P. at 91.
58. See Midland Publ'g Co., Inc. v. Dist. Court Judge (In re Midland Publ'g Co., Inc.), 317
N.W.2d 284, 285, 288 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
59. See SYNOVATE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION-IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT 5 (2003),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/synovatereport.pdf (noting that 12.7% of national
survey participants reported being victims of identity theft in the past five years); see also FED.
TRADE COMM'N, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION OVERVIEW OF THE IDENTITY THEFT PROGRAM

OCTOBER
1998-SEPTEMBER
2003
7
(2003),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/timelinereport.pdf (noting an increase in reported cases of identity
theft from 1380 in 1999, to a projected 210,000 in 2003); FED. TRADE COMM'N, ID THEFT: WHEN
BAD THINGS HAPPEN TO YOUR GOOD NAME 1-2 (Nov. 2003) [hereinafter ID THEFT], availableat
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/credit/idtheft.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IDENTITY
FRAUD: INFORMATION ON PREVALENCE, COST, AND INTERNET IMPACT IS LIMITED 40-45 (1998),
GAO/GGD-98-100BR, available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/gg98100b.pdf.
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undermine the relationship of trust between physician and patient.6 °
Congress has attempted to address some of the social problems created
by electronic financial and health care records through the enactment of
privacy legislation.61
In Section 205 of the E-Government Act of 2002, Congress directed
the federal court system to implement public access to the Internet by
2004 and also directed the Judicial Conference to promulgate rules to
address concerns about the privacy and security of personal information
in light of the best practices of the federal and state courts. 62 The EGovernment Act places considerable discretion in the hands of the
courts, and indicates a congressional deference to the courts to be
63
responsible for the management and oversight of their own records.
However, the language -in the E-Government Act clearly shows that
Congress believed that, as always, courts continue to have a
responsibility to balance the benefits of public access against the concern
for the security and privacy of individuals.
It is also important to remember in this context that courts have a
responsibility not only to protect the litigants-most of whom ft least
are represented by counsel (although an increasing number of litigants
are acting pro se)-but also a responsibility to witnesses, victims, jurors,
and other third parties who enter the legal system without the due
process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.64 Courts must ensure
that those who encounter the legal system-voluntarily as well as
involuntarily--do not face exploitation of their personal information by
commercial information brokers or become the victims of cybercriminals or electronic peeping toms.
D.

Legal Protectionsfor the Privacy Value in PracticalObscurity

The information age has transformed the world so quickly that there
has been little time to develop case law that adjusts the balance between
public access and the protection of personal information with the
60. See Peter A. Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy Rules and the
Common Law, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 617, 634-39 (2002).
61. Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2000); Fair Credit Reporting Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681v (2000); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
6801-6827 (2000); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1320d-1320d-8 (2000).
62. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205, 116 Stat. 2899, 2913-15.

63. Id.
64. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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differences between electronic and paper records in mind. However,
from the limited number of cases addressing the question of
computerized information, there is a growing recognition by courts that
a very different balance must be applied. In Whalen, the fact that the
information was compiled in a mainframe computer database was of
tremendous significance to the Court.65 Although the Court found that
the system of protections established by the government passed
constitutional muster, 66 Justice Brennan wrote a concurrence that was
prescient as to the future problems to come:
What is more troubling about this scheme, however, is the
central computer storage of the data thus collected. Obviously,
as the State argues, collection and storage of data by the State
that is in itself legitimate is not rendered unconstitutional simply
because new technology makes the State's operations more
efficient. However, as the example of the Fourth Amendment
shows, the Constitution puts limits not only on the type of
information the State may gather, but also on the means it may
use to gather it. The central storage and easy accessibility of
computerized data vastly increases the potential for abuse of that
information, and I am not prepared to say that future
developments will not demonstrate the necessity of some curb
on such technology. 67
The case that is perhaps most applicable to the problem of electronic
judicial records is United States Department of Justice v. Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press.68 In this FOIA case, Justice
Stevens cited Whalen in rejecting the press's argument that because a
person's FBI computerized rap sheet was merely a summary of public
records of arrests and convictions from local state and county
courthouses around the country, the FBI computerized rap sheet itself
should be a public document accessible under the FOIA. 69 He observed:
"Plainly there is a vast difference between the public records that might
be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and
local police stations throughout the country and a 7computerized
0
summary located in a single clearinghouse of information.,
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977).
Id. at 600.
Id. at 606-07 (Brennan, J., concurring).
489 U.S. 749 (1989).
Id. at 762-63.

70. Id. at 764.
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Strictly speaking, of course, the test established by Justice Stevens in
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press applies only in a FOIA
context to the FBI's record-keeping system (although it involved court
records). However, the underlying problems in that case-the problems
of balancing public access to information against concerns for individual
privacy-are exactly the same. Thus, the balance reached by the
Supreme Court in that case represents an extremely important precedent.
The Court defined the public's interest as shedding "light on the conduct
of any Government agency or official" rather than acquiring information
about a particular private citizen. 71 The Court also noted "the fact that
,an event is not wholly 'private' does not mean than an individual has no
interest in limiting disclosure or dissemination of the information."' 72 As
in the case of the rap sheets addressed in Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press, before the advent of electronic case files, the right
to "inspect and copy" court files depended on physical presence at the
courthouse. The inherent difficulty of obtaining and distributing paper
case files largely insulated litigants and third parties from the harm that
could result from massive or unnecessary exposure, dissemination, or
misuse of information provided in connection with a legal proceeding.
When the U.S. Supreme Court has focused on the new world of
electronic information, it recognized that it had to alter the balance
formerly adopted between the competing policies of granting and
limiting access to judicial records.
E.

The Way Forward

If the message of Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press is
followed by courts about to adopt a system of electronic judicial recordkeeping, it would appear that there must be a new balancing that takes
place. Courts must recognize that their case files often contain private or
sensitive personal information-such as medical and health records,
employment records, detailed financial information, tax returns, Social
Security numbers, intimate family information, intimate victim
information, and other personal and identifying information. In the
world of paper judicial records, the inconvenience of access provides
considerable practical protection for the concerned individuals.
71. Id. at 773.
72. Id. at 770 (quoting Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and

Effective Law Enforcement?, Nelson Timothy Stephens Lectures, University of Kansas Law School,
pt. 1, p. 13 (Sept. 26-27, 1974)).
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However, when courts permit these case files to become electronic and
connected to the Internet without proper safeguards, they will make all
this personal information available easily and almost instantly for
downloading, storage, searching, data compilation, aggregation, and
massive dissemination for purposes that were never intended by either
litigants, witnesses, victims, jurors, or others involved with or connected
to a court proceeding.
F.

Maintainingthe Balance in the Movement to Online Court Records

Reaching a balance between judicial accountability and the protection
of privacy was not an easy task in the days of paper-based judicial
records. The cases reflect a continual struggle between the goals of
ensuring open access to court records and the competing goals of
ensuring the effective working of the judicial system and respecting the
privacy of the participants. The decisions are fact specific and highly
contextual, but they all reflect sensitivity by the courts to the importance
of balancing the various competing interests at stake. In the world of
electronic information, the conflict between principles of open access
and privacy becomes much more sharp and difficult for courts to
resolve. There is no easy solution. Ideally, courts should be free to
engage in the same common law decision-making process that courts
used to resolve such conflicts in the age of paper-based judicial records.
Unfortunately, the most important decisions will not take place as a
matter of case-by-case decision making, but will be the decisions that
courts make as an administrative matter when they select the
computerized record-keeping system they will use and when they
establish the rules governing the use of that system. The balance must be
worked out in the way administrative agencies make decisionspresumably after notice, public participation, comment, and thoughtful
reflection on the costs and benefits of the various alternatives. A
thoughtful set of guidelines for public access to court records has been
produced by the National Center for State Courts and the Justice
Management Institute.73 In the same vein, the Canadian Judicial Council

73. MARTHA WADE STEKETEE & ALAN CARLSON, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & THE
JUSTICE MGMT. INST., DEVELOPING CCJ/COSCA GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT
RECORDS: A NATIONAL PROJECT TO ASSIST STATE COURTS (2002), available at

http://www.courtaccess.org/modelpolicy/18Oct2002FinalReport.pdf.
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has released a very thoughtful discussion paper on open courts,
electronic access to court records, and privacy.74
G.

The Experience of the FederalCourts

Perhaps the most significant development in the context of this debate
is the Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Court
Administration and Case Management on Privacy and Public Access to
Electronic Case Files (Report).7 5 Before the Judicial Conference
Committee on Court Administration and Case Management (Committee)
issued the Report, a study of the problem was prepared by the staff of
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. 76 The staff white
paper described two general approaches to the problem.77 One approach
was to treat electronic judicial records as governed by exactly the same
rules as paper records-what the white paper calls the "public is public"
approach. 78 The second approach advocated treating electronic and paper
files differently in order to respect the practical obscurity of paper case
files, urging that the rules regulating electronic court records reflect the
fact that unrestricted online access to court records would undoubtedly,
as a practical matter, compromise privacy, as well as increase the risk of
personal harm to litigants and third parties whose private information
appeared in case files. 79 The white paper suggested that different levels
of privileges could be created to govern electronic access to court
records. 8 ° Under this approach, judges and court staff would generally
have broad, although not unlimited, remote access to all electronic case
files, as would other key participants in the judicial process, such as the
74. SUBCOMM. FOR THE JUDGES TECH. ADVISORY COMM., CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL,
DISCUSSION PAPER ON OPEN COURTS, ELECTRONIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS, AND PRIVACY

(2003), available at http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/english/publications/OpenCourts-2-EN.pdf.
75. SUBCOMM. ON PRIVACY & PUB. ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE FILES, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND
CASE MANAGEMENT ON PRIVACY AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE FILES (2001)
[hereinafter
REPORT],
available
at
http://www.courtaccess.org/federal/documents/report-

elecfiles200 I.pdf. The Judicial Conference is charged with the responsibility for making policy with
regard to the administration of the United States courts. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000).
76. OFFICE OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, PRIVACY AND ACCESS
TO ELECTRONIC
CASE
FILES IN
THE
FEDERAL
COURTS
(1999),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/privacyn.pdf.
77. Id. at 7.

78. Id.
79. Id. at 7.
80. Id. at 10.
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U.S. Attorney, the U.S. Trustee, and bankruptcy case trustees. 81 Litigants
and theirattorneys would have unrestricted access to the files relevant to
their own cases. 82 The general public would have remote access to a
subset of the full case file, including, in most cases, pleadings, briefs,
orders, and opinions.83 Under this approach, the entire electronic case
file could still be viewed at the clerk's office, just as the paper file is
available now for inspection, but would not generally be made available
on the Internet.84
Unfortunately, at least with respect to civil cases and bankruptcy
cases, few, if any, of the suggestions contained in the staff white paper
were ultimately adopted in the Report.85 Instead, the Committee adopted
the "public is public" approach to the problem, rejecting the view that
courts have a responsibility to adopt rules governing the use of their
computer systems to try to recreate in cyberspace the practical balance
that existed in the world of paper judicial records.86 In supporting this
decision, the Committee took the position that attempting to recreate the
"practical obscurity" of the brick and mortar world was simply too
complicated an exercise for the courts to undertake.8 7 The Report does
appear to recognize a limited responsibility on the part of the courts to
adopt rules in order to limit the foreseeable harms of identity theft and
online stalking. 88 The Report recommends that certain "personal data
identifiers," such as Social Security numbers, dates of birth, financial
account numbers, and names of minor children, be partially redacted by
the litigants. 89
With respect to the problem of protecting individual privacy, the
Report places the burden on parties and counsel to anticipate these
questions, and advises them to use motions to seal and for protective
orders on a case-by-case basis. 90 Although it is reasonable to hold the

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See REPORT, supranote 75, at 3-7.
86. See id. at 4.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 6.
89. Id. at 3-5. Social Security case files were excluded entirely from online access, presumably
because of the large amount of personal health information contained in such files. Id. at 5.
90. Id. at 3. The Committee's Report recognizes that the public access requirement of the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 107 (2002), appears to preclude bankruptcy courts from sealing any
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parties and their attorneys primarily responsible to protect their own
privacy, the Report could have and should have done more in this
respect. For instance, its guidelines could have included more explicit
warnings to attorneys to exercise caution when filing any personal
identifying number, such as a driver's license number, medical records,
treatment and diagnosis, employment history, individual financial
records, information pertaining to children, or proprietary or trade secret
information. 91 The most significant weakness in the Report is that it
leaves unanswered the question of how the system will protect the
privacy of pro se litigants or third parties who are not litigants or have
not voluntarily chosen to enter the justice system-foremost among
these are92jurors, witnesses, victims of crimes, and their family
members.
The Report recommends that criminal court records not be placed
online, for the present, finding that any benefits of remote electronic
access to criminal files would be outweighed by the safety and law
enforcement risks such access would create. 93 The Report expressed the
concern that allowing defendants and others easy access to information
regarding the cooperation and other activities of co-defendants would
increase the risk that the information would be used to intimidate,
harass, and possibly harm victims, defendants, and their families.9 4 In
addition, the Report noted that merely sealing such documents would not
adequately address the problems of online access, since the fact that a

court records to protect the privacy of individuals. REPORT, supra note 75, at 6. The Committee
responds to this concern by suggesting that Congress amend 11 U.S.C. § 107 to address this
problem. Id. In the meantime, it would presumably be possible for a court to order that certain
records be filed publicly in the clerk's office, but kept off-line. In addition, it would appear to be
possible, as some bankruptcy courts have done, to adopt local rules requiring certain types of
information-such as Social Security numbers, numbers of financial accounts, and names of minor
children-not be placed in the court file at all, while still providing this information to key
participants in the system. Id.
91. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District of Texas, Privacy-Related Rules Changes
(Nov. 24, 2003) (implementing explicit procedures related to privacy and public access to electronic
court files), available at http://www.txnb.uscourts.gov/notices/20031124 Privacy.pdf.
92. The problem of protecting innocent third parties from harm is particularly pressing in
bankruptcy cases. For instance, in large Chapter 11 cases, "First Day" orders typically provide for
the payment of back wages of employees of the debtor. These orders typically contain large
amounts of sensitive personal information, including salaries, health benefit information, and Social
Security numbers. Innocent third parties, usually family members, are also usually implicated in
individual bankruptcy cases.
93. REPORT, supra note 75, at 5.

94. Id.
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document is sealed signals probable defendant cooperation and covert
law enforcement initiatives. 95
Of course, as federal courts have converted to electronic filing
systems, criminal records are filed electronically as well. However, for
criminal cases, access to electronic criminal records is controlled
through a system of privileges. Judges and law clerks have full access to
criminal court records, as do defense attorneys and prosecutors in those
cases in which they are counsel. While members of the general public do
not have online access to the criminal court files, copies of indictments
and other documents that were publicly available in the past continue to
be publicly available-by request in person at the clerk's office. There is
no technological reason why, on a case-by-case basis, a third partysuch as a newspaper reporter or other interested member of the publiccould not request similar electronic access to the case file. However, this
access would be permitted only after notice to the other parties in the
case who could be heard if electronic public access might involve any
special risks.
From the limited experience in criminal cases, it appears that courts
do have the capacity to implement an electronic system that uses
different levels of privileges to recreate in cyberspace a system that
protects the same values that were protected by the practical obscurity of
paper records. Implementing a system of privileges does not appear to
present any serious technological problems-the architecture of the
federal PACER system is the same for both civil and criminal judicial
records. However, if this is a correct evaluation of the current
technology used by clerks in federal courts, a somewhat disturbing
conclusion follows. It would appear that the Committee, at least in the
case of civil and bankruptcy cases, simply made a decision to ignore the
legal decisions with respect to the existence of a right to privacy in the
practical obscurity of judicial records-or to have made a determination
that these cases represented the wrong public policy. If so, one would
hope that the Committee could have expressed the underlying basis of its
decision more clearly. As it is, the Report leaves an outside observer
with the disquieting feeling that the Committee may be using technology
not as a reason, but as an excuse.
Under the mandates of the E-Government Act, the federal judiciary
will continue to review and monitor the process of online access. 96 The
95. Id.
96. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205, 116 Stat. 2899, 2913-15.
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Report itself recognizes that the federal courts will ultimately have to
revise their rules and procedures about electronic access to judicial
records in the light of experience.97 In doing so, the Committee will have
to consider the concrete experience of both federal and state courts as
they experiment with different models of information protection. In the
meantime, both federal and state courts are likely to see considerably
more litigation regarding motions to seal records and for protective
orders. In the context of this litigation, parties desiring to protect
personal information but unable to meet the standard for a seal or a
protective order, may consider requesting the intermediate relief that
documents filed electronically in their civil cases simply be kept off-line,
in the same manner as criminal case files in the federal court. Under this
approach, the parties might continue to have electronic access to their
court file, and the court file would continue to be available for public
viewing at the clerk's office, or be made available electronically on the
filing of a notice of appearance by any interested person. The parties
should have the right to request that their personal information-and the
personal information of others-simply not be made available for
unrestricted access on the Internet.
H.

Tentative Suggestions

In ruling on motions to protect personal information from online
invasions of privacy, as well as in the process of fashioning local rules
governing online access, the Westinghouse test 98 may prove to be a
model of how courts may have to determine what type of information
parties should be permitted to protect. Is it the type of information that
society as a whole is prepared to recognize as involving a reasonable
expectation of privacy? What is the potential for harm to the person in
the disclosure of that information? What is the potential for harm to the
relationship in which the information was generated (that is, is there any
confidential relationship involving broader societal policies protecting
those relationships)? What safeguards can be put in place to protect the
information in electronic form in the courthouse or remotely? What
procedures and criteria should there be for allowing access in specific
instances to otherwise confidential or private information, or in specific
instances protecting sensitive or private information when it would

97. See REPORT, supra note 75, at 2.
98. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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otherwise be publicly accessible? And finally, what is the need for
access of the public and the press?
III.

CONCLUSION

This is obviously only a beginning sketch. The problem requires a
great deal more reflection and thought. What is clear, however, is the
need for more focus on the concrete ways in which information in
judicial records is being used in our society. The general principles to be
used in establishing the right balance are well established. There should
be a general presumption in favor of public access, especially when it
ensures judicial accountability and facilitates the administration of
justice. However, courts must take steps to restrict public access when
indiscriminate access conflicts with the administration of justice, when it
unnecessarily causes invasions of privacy, or when it exposes litigants,
witnesses, and other innocent third parties to threats from the potential
misuse of their personal information. The courts should also frame their
rules of procedure-local and national-and their instructions to
attorneys and litigants to ensure that attorneys and unrepresented
litigants know how to take responsibility for identifying sensitive
personal information that should be candidates for protection, and are
capable of doing so.99 The courts can facilitate this process by
encouraging the use of protective orders and motions to seal.
Ironically, it appears that a technological revolution that was
supposed to be labor saving will require greater exertion than before
from courts and attorneys. In the face of the difficulty of this project,
there is a strong temptation to adopt the "public is public" approach,
dismissing the concept of "practical obscurity" altogether. However, the
temptation to permit indiscriminate electronic public access to court
records should be resisted, for it threatens to eviscerate years of careful
judicial labor in which courts struggled to achieve an appropriate
balance between the competing goals of public access and privacy. In
this vein, rejection of the values underlying the concept of "practical
obscurity" can be seen as nothing more than a policy decision by the
courts to shift the risk of harm to litigants, witnesses, victims, jurors, and

99. For an excellent analysis of the potential malpractice liability of attorneys for failure to take
reasonable care to protect their clients' sensitive personal information in the context of online court
filings, see Michael Caughey, Comment, Keeping Attorneys from Trashing Identities: Malpractice
as Backstop Protection for Clients Under the United States Judicial Conference's Policy on
Electronic CourtRecords, 79 WASH. L. REv. 407 (2004).
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other innocent third parties whose personal information becomes
implicated in judicial proceedings.
This Article has discussed how the use of electronic information
makes it much more difficult to balance the need to maintain judicial
accountability against the need to protect personal information in court
files. As we struggle to maintain this balance, we may discover that the
problem is not limited to what is filed in the clerk's office and that we
ultimately have to see this problem in the context of the more general
issue of how to regulate the flow of information throughout the judicial
system. Traditionally, information exchanged between attorney and
client received presumptive protection, while information contained in
court files was presumptively open. As electronic information flows
from clients to their lawyers and into online court filings, we may be
forced to modify this traditional presumption in order to recognize the
fact that different types of information have different potentials for
misuse depending on their different legal contexts. Even now, the
decision of the Committee to keep electronic criminal records off-line
marks an important change in our understanding of the need to handle
"public" information in court files responsibly. Given the obvious
dangers of placing information in criminal case files online, the federal
courts were simply forced to treat this information differently from how
they treat information in civil files. As more and more courts go online,
we may be forced to adopt different rules for access to information in
different types of legal proceedings, depending on the potential for that
information to be misused.
We have lived in a very forgiving world. The "practical obscurity" of
paper judicial records largely sheltered us from the danger of
information misuse, while we prided ourselves on our "public" judicial
system. The world of electronic information is a far less forgiving place.
It is now forcing us to recognize-by our actions, if not yet by our
words-that the simple abstract rules developed for a world of paperbased information may no longer suffice to resolve the complex
problems of judicial information management. Courts have traditionally
been vigilant in protecting individuals from the misuse of sensitive
personal information. They must now rise to the difficult task of
designing rules to protect litigants and third parties from cyber-mischief
and victimization. The failure of the legal system to maintain the ancient
balance between access and privacy will lead to the greatest danger of
all-inhibiting citizens from participating in the public judicial system.
The world of cyber-justice should not be permitted to degenerate into a
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world where victims of crimes are reluctant to come forward; where
people are more unwilling to be witnesses or jurors; and where the rich
can seek out private judicial forums to resolve their disputes, while the
poor and middle classes are faced with an impossible choice-either
foregoing justice to maintain their privacy and security; or permitting
their sensitive personal information to be commercialized or stolen, and
allowing the intimate details of their personal lives to be made available
all over the Internet.
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